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ARGUMENT 
I. The Well Drilling Agreement 
The Fillmores acknowledge that they entered an agreement with Mr. Duspiva for Mr. 
Duspiva to drill a well for the horne of Clyde Fillmore's son John Fillmore. They assert that it was 
"an agreement to drill a cold water, domestic well of200 feet at $32.50 per foot." RB at 19. They 
dispute that they agreed, either initially or after drilling commenced, to drill any deeper. They do 
not acknowledge any other terms or conditions of the well drilling agreement. 
Fillmores argue that they are not obligated to pay Mr. Duspiva for the drilling service he 
provided because: (1) the depth of the well exceeded 200 feet; (2) the well was completed as a low 
temperature geothermal (LTG, 85 0 F) well, and they had agreed only to the drilling of a cold water 
well; (3) Mr. Duspiva drilled the well illegally, in violation of the LTG condition of the drilling 
permit, resulting in an "illegal LTG well"; (4) the well drilling agreement was for acts forbidden by 
law, and (5) Mr. Duspiva "hid the details" of the LTG conditions in the well from the Fillmores until 
after it had become an "illegal LTG well." RB at 16-19. 
These arguments ignore the actual terms and conditions of the well drilling agreement, 
disregard this Court's interpretation of well drilling contracts, misrepresent Mr. Duspiva's drilling 
conduct as "illegal", and misrepresent Mr. Duspiva's communications with the Fillmores regarding 
LTG conditions of the well. 
A. The Terms and Conditions of the Well Drilling Agreement 
Although the district court stated that its finding that Mr. Duspiva violated the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act rendered "an analysis of whether or not a contract was formed between 
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the parties unnecessary as it may be treated as voidable" (AR, Vol. II, p. 297), it nonetheless made 
the following findings and conclusions regarding the well drilling agreement: 
6. On June 11.2007, Clyde Fillmore and Gary Duspiva met at Clyde Fillmore's shop to 
discuss the well location and the terms and conditions of drilling services. 
7. The location of the well was decided by Clyde Fillmore. 
8. Clyde Fillmore was informed that the well would cost $32.50 per foot plus 
incidentals defined as the cost of a drive shoe, well cap, and permit. The cost of 
the permit was $80.00. No other costs were defined or discussed. Gary Duspiva 
stated that his allowance for sand in the water was a pinch of sand per five (5) 
gallons of water. Gary Duspiva informed Clyde Fillmore that he did not use 
screens ill his wells. No further explanation for this practice was provided to Clyde 
Fillmore. No guarantee of quantity or quality was provided. 
9. The parties did not enter into a written agreement for the drilling of the well. 
AR. Vol. II, pp. 289-290 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the agreement that was reached between the paIiies was that Mr. Duspiva 
was to drill and develop a domestic well for the Fillmores. There was no discussion of 
water temperature; however, the FiIImores had no reason to expect that they were 
bargaining for any1hing other than a cold water domestic well. The cost agreed to by 
the parties was $32.50 per foot of depth of the well. There was no specific 
discllssion about depth at the outset of this transactioll except that the Start Card 
that Mr. Duspiva had John Fillmore sign indicated that the well would not exceed 
200 feet ill depth. Clearly, the greater the depth of the well, the greater the price that 
would be billed by Mr. Duspiva. 
!d .. p. 297-298 (emphasis added). 
The district court's description ofthe discussion between Mr. Duspiva and Clyde and the 
\vell drilling agreement they entered on June 11, 2007 is largely correct and complete, with a few 
important exceptions. See Appellants' Brief ("AB"), at 3-4, 9-10. In addition to the base price of 
$32.50 per foot, there would be an increase in price of$2.00 per foot for every foot over 400 feet of 
drilling depth. Tr., Vol. 1, p 37, In. 16 - p. 38, In. 7; Tr., Vol. la, p. 18, Ins. 3-13. 
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While water temperature was not discussed on June 11,2007, the only water quality issue 
discussed was Clyde's concern about preventing sand from entering the proposed well, because his 
own well pumped sand, requiring him to replace his well pump every four years. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 37, 
Ins. 4-8. As explained by the district court, Mr. Duspiva addressed this concern by advising Clyde 
of his standard of allowance for sand in the water. The district court correctly found that Mr. 
Duspiva explained to Clyde that he did not use screens when drilling wells to reduce sand in the 
'"vater. Tr.. Vol. 1, p. 38, Ins. 20-22. However, the district court improperly inferred that Mr. 
Duspiva gave no further explanation of this practice to Clyde. AR, Vol. II, pp. 289-290, ~16. 
Neither Mr. Duspiva nor Clyde testified that Mr. Duspiva did not provide any further explanation 
for his practice of not using screens (i.e. explaining why he did not use screens). Clyde testified that 
he recalled this discussion, but did not recall the extent ofMr. Duspiva's explanation. Tr., Vol. 1 a, 
p. 11. Ins. 4-7. Accordingly, the record does not support the district court's finding that Mr. Duspiva 
provided no such explanation during the June 11, 2007 meeting. 
In addition to advising Clyde that he didn't guarantee quantity or quality of water produced 
by the welL Mr. Duspiva explained that: "The footage price was whether it was a well or a dry hole, 
because my prices are for the service of drilling the well." Tr., Vol. 1, p. 39. Ins. 17-19. This 
aspect of the agreement is consistent with this Court's recognition that, due to the unceliainties 
inherent in drilling underground for water: "In a contract for drilling a water well, there is no 
implied undeliaking that water will be obtained or that the well will be a success as to the quantity 
or quality of the water obtained, but only that the work shall be done in a workmanlike manner with 
the ordinary skill of those who undertake such work." Durfee v. Parker, 90 Idaho 118, 121, 10 P.2d 
962. 963 (1965), quoting Knoblock v. Arenguena, 85 Idaho 503, 380 P.2d 898 (1963). 
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In summary, the following are the terms and conditions ofthe well drilling agreement entered 
on June 11,2007: 
(1) $32.50 per foot of well depth, plus various incidental parts, materials, permit and 
development costs; 
(2) price increase of $2.00 per foot for every foot over 400 feet of drilling depth; 
(3) Mr. Duspiva's allowance for sand in the well was a pinch of sand per five (5) gallons 
of water; 
(4) Mr. Duspiva did not use screens to prevent sand from entering wells; 
(5) Mr. Duspiva did not guarantee the quality or quantity of water produced by the well; 
(6) "[t]he footage price was whether it was a well or a dry hole, because my prices are for 
the service of drilling the well." 
B. The Start Card 200 Foot "Proposed Maximum Depth" Was Not a Term or 
Condition of the Well Drilling Agreement 
The Fillmores attempt to impute to the agreement a condition that the well would not exceed 
200 feet in depth because the "Start Card/Permit" signed by Mr. Duspiva and John Fillmore 
(Plaintiff sEx. 1, Detendants' Ex. C) stated that the "proposed maximum depth" would be 200 feet. 
In an apparent effort to add weight to this argument, the Fillmores imply that exceeding the 200 foot 
depth violated the conditions of the Start Card and IDWR rules. RB at 3, 10 fn. 5. 
Fillmores' argument contradicts the district court's finding that: " There was no specific 
discussion about depth at the outset of this transaction except that the Stmi Card that Mr. Duspiva 
had John Fillmore sign indicated that the well would not exceed 200 feet in depth."1 The Fillmores' 
argument is also contradicted by the provision for additional charges if the well depth exceeded 400 
feet, and by his instruction to Mr. Duspiva to keep drilling when Mr. Duspiva found no water at 200 
feet and at subsequent depths. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 45, Ins. 14-23; Tr. Vol. la, p. 21, In. 23 - p. 22, In. 5. 
I The district court's implication that Mr. Duspiva established the 200 foot proposed 
maximum depth is misleading. In response to the court's questions, Clyde testified that he came 
Lip with the 200 foot depth, not Mr. Duspiva, based on Clyde'S 180-foot, sand-laden well. Tr., 
Vo!' 1. p. 30, In. 13 - p. 3 LIn. 14. 
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The Start Card itself does not limit well depth, prohibit drilling below the "proposed 
maximum depth, or require a well driller to cease drilling once the driller reaches the proposed 
maximum depth. Plaintiff sEx. 1, Defendants' Ex. C. The line for identifying "proposed maximum 
depth" appears in the informational section of the Start Card under "Well Construction Information." 
Below that informational section is the section entitled "Conditions For Use of a Start Card," which 
includes 13 conditions. The Fillmores have not identified any statute that prohibits a well driller 
from exceeding the maximum proposed depth identified in a drilling permit, or requires a driller to 
stop drilling and inform IDWR when that depth is exceeded. IDWR's Well Construction Standards 
do not address proposed depths in drilling permits or compliance with well drilling permit 
conditions. IDAPA 37.03.09. IDWR's Well Driller Licensing Rules require that a well driller 
comply with IDWR's "well construction standards and drilling permit conditions." IDAPA 
37.03.10.50.01.b.2 Since "proposed maximum depth" is neither a well construction standard nor 
a permit condition. it cannot be argued that continuing to drill past 200 feet in depth was 
impermissible. 
Robert Whitney, the Senior Water Resource Agent for the Idaho Depmiment of Water 
ResourcesC'IDWR") in charge of regulation of well construction in southwest Idaho, testified that: 
it is not uncommon for wells to exceed maximum depths proposed on Stmi Cards; that IDWR has 
not viewed the proposed maximum depth information as a condition of the pem1it; that he is not 
a\vare of an IDWR enforcement action for exceeding maximum depth, and that IDWR has no hard 
and fast rule requiring that well drillers not exceed the proposed maximum depth. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 
2 At page 7 of their brief, Fillmores appear to paraphrase and incorrectly cite this rule as 
fDAPA 37.03.060.01(b). IDAPA 37.03.06 is the citation for IDWR's Safety of Dams Rules. 
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149, In. 22 - p. 151, In. 21. The other IDWR witness called by Fillmores, Tom Neace, testified that 
there is no IDWR policy that states that exceeding the maximum depth without prior approval is a 
violation of the Start Card. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 202, Ins. 10-25. 
C. Water Temperature Was Not a Term or Condition ofthe Well Drilling Agreement 
The Fillmores argue that they intended for the well to produce cold water and that "[t]here 
vvas never any agreement to drill a LTG well." RB at 17. The district court found that on June 11, 
2007 there was no discussion of water temperature. AR, Vol. II at 297. Mr. Duspiva made it clear 
that he did not guarantee the quality or the quantity of the water that the well would produce. "In 
a contract for drilling a water well, there is no implied undertaking that water will be obtained or that 
the well will be a success as to the quantity or quality of the water obtained." See Dwiee v. Purker, 
supru. 
The Fillmores did not define their cold water expectations. They did not explain what 
temperature water they expected the well to produce. They did not testify that the temperature of 
the water at the bottom of the well mattered to their intended use. They did not produce any 
evidence to show the actual temperature of the water that would discharge from the well when Mr. 
Duspiva finished drilling. In other words, they did not produce any evidence to show that the water 
that the well would produce would not meet their cold water expectations. The evidence indicates 
that. at levels where the well encountered LTG temperature strata (600 feet and lower as indicated 
by clay cuttings), the water discharging from the well was closer to 70° F. Plaintiffs Ex. 4. 
The "sum total" of the well drilling agreement was to drill a domestic well. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
5.1n. 12 - p. 6. In. 11. There was no testimony that a LTG well can't be use for domestic purposes. 
Clyde testified that no one told him that he could not use a LTG well for domestic use. Tr. Vol. 1, 
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p. 26, Ins. 9-12. Mr. Duspiva testified that the three LTG wells he drilled before drilling the well for 
the Fillmores are all used for domestic purposes. Id., p. 84, Ins. 4-13. 
Idaho statutory and regulatory definitions do not limit domestic use to cold water uses. Idaho 
Code section 42-111 provides: 
Domestic purposes defined. (1) For purposes of sections 42-221, 42-227, 42-230, 
42-235, 42-237a, 42-242, 42-243 and 42-1401A, Idaho Code, the phrase "domestic 
purposes" or "domestic uses" means: 
(a) The use of water for homes, organization camps, public campgrounds, 
livestock and for any other purpose in connection therewith, including irrigation 
of up to one-half (112) acre of land, if the total use is not in excess of thirteen 
thousand (13,000) gallons per day, or 
(b) Any other uses, if the total use does not exceed a diversion rate of four one-
hundredths (0.04) cubic feet per second and a diversion volume of twenty-five 
hundred (2,500) gallons per day. 
Domestic use is not defined in IDWR's Well Construction Standards Rules (IDAPA 
37.03.09) or its Well Drilling Licensing Rules (IDAPA 37.03.10).3 Domestic purposes is defined 
in IDWR's Water Appropriation Rules: 
Single Family Domestic Purposes. Water for household use or livestock and water 
used for all other purposes including irrigation of up to one half (112) acre ofland in 
connection with said household where total use is not in excess of thirteen thousand 
(13,000) gallons per day. 
IDAPA 37.03.08.010.15. 
Accordingly, the water temperature of the well was not an express or implied term or 
condition of the agreement. 
3Both sets of rules define "well" as: "An artificial excavation or opening in the ground 
more than eighteen (18) feet in vertical depth below land surface by which ground water of any 
temperature is sought or obtained." IDAPA 37.03.09.010.30; 37.03.10.010.26 (emphasis 
added). 
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D. Duspiva Did Not Violate Start Card Condition 8 
The Fillmores erroneously assert that Mr. Duspiva violated condition 8 of the Start Card that 
he and the Filmores filed with IDWR, which provides: "If a bottom hole temperature of 85 F, or 
greater is encountered, well construction shall cease and the well driller shall contact the Department 
immediately." AR, Vol. II., p. 290, ~14. They erroneously argue that penetrating LTG water is 
itself a violation, rendering the well itself an "illegal LTG well." 
IDWR Well Construction Standards Rules define "bottom hole temperature of an existing 
or proposed well" as: "The temperature of the ground water encountered in the bottom ofa well." 
IDAPA37.03.09.01O.09. Obviously, a bottom hole temperature ("BHT') at or above LTG cannot 
be encountered until after a well has been drilled into strata containing LTG water. Thus, condition 
8 does not prohibit or make "illegal" drilling into LTG conditions as argued by Fillmores. Condition 
8 recognizes the possibility that a well driller will encounter LTG conditions, and directs the driller 
to immediately contact IDWR. 
At trial, Robert Whitney corrected Fillmore's counsel when he mischaracterized his 
testimony regarding condition 8 of the Start Card: 
[MR. SMITH]: ... Q. Okay. And you asked [Duspiva] to submit the long form 
application, you testified, because condition 8 in the start card had been violated, 
correct? 
MR. GOULD: Objection --
THE COURT: Overruled. 
The Witness: I believe my statement, Mr. Smith, was that since the low temperature 
geothermal condition had been encountered, that start card became invalid, which 
is why we required the submittal of the long form application. 
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Q. (By Mr. Smith) Thank you. That is a much better explanation. My question was 
not as precise. And I appreciate that clarification. And I think you are correct. As 
you said that, that's what I recall. So once the start card is no longer applicable, a 
new permit is required; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 148, In. 9 - p. 149, In. 4 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Fillmores' arguments, as required by condition 8 of the Start Card, when Mr. 
Ouspiva discovered that the well had encountered LTG conditions on August 8, 2007, he 
immediately ceased drilling activities, and advised the Fillmores and IOWR. 
E. Mr. Duspiva Did Not Drill an "Illegal Well" For the Fillmores 
The Fillmores repeatedly (ten times) characterize Mr. Ouspiva's well drilling and the well 
as "illegaL" apparently believing that repetition makes it so. In fact, no witness testified that either 
Mr. Ouspiva' s well drilling activities or the well he drilled for the Fillmores were "illegal." To 
buttress this argument, Fillmores' repeatedly (four times) refer to allegations related to LTG 
conditions that were encountered in 3 ofthe 342 wells Mr. Ouspiva drilled for others before he and 
the Fillmores entered the well drilling agreement at issue in this case. RB at 5, 7,10 fn. 5. 
The Fillmores' claim that the well was not drilled in accordance with LTG standards is 
misleading. After encountering LTG conditions and contacting IOWR as required by the Start Card, 
Mr. Ouspiva complied with IOWR staff instruction by submitting to IOWR a prospectus for 
completing the well and a long form drilling permit application. After IOWR approved the 
prospectus and the permit, Mr. Duspiva continued and completed drilling in accordance with the 
prospectus and the approved permit, as well as the Fillmores' instruction. The well was never 
completed as proposed because the Fillmores did not authorize completion. Ultimately, the well was 
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abandoned. It is true that, because the well was not completed, it does not meet the well completion 
requirements of Rule 30 ofIDWR's Well Construction Standards. This does not mean that the well 
"vas "illegal" or that Mr. Duspiva's drilling work violated that rule or any other IDWR requirement. 
F. The Well Drilling Agreement Was Not For Acts Forbidden By Law 
Obviously, well drilling is not forbidden by law. Fillmores have not argued that any of the 
terms or conditions of the well drilling agreement (summarized supra at 4) are forbidden by law. 
Fillmores argue that the well drilling agreement is "void and unenforceable" because Mr. 
Duspiva "drilled the well in contradiction of Condition 8 of the Start Card Permit and IDWR well 
dril ling rules," and "the well was not constructed to IDWR LTG well construction standards." RB 
at 18-19. As previously explained, neither of these contentions regarding Mr. Duspiva's conduct is 
supported by the facts. Mr. Duspiva did not violate condition 8 of the Start Card Permit. Condition 
8 does not prohibit a well driller from enountering LTG conditions, it simply requires the driller to 
stop and inform IDWR, as Mr. Duspiva did on August 8th and 9th of2007. After IDWR approved 
the prospectus and long fonn permit application Mr. Duspiva submitted to IDWR to complete the 
well as a LTG welL he continued drilling in compliance with the prospectus and permit. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. 
In any event, the Fillmores have not shown that the well drilling agreement was entered for 
the purpose or with the intention of violating any law. Arguments that Mr. Duspiva did not strictly 
comply with IDWR requirements while drilling the well do not establish that the well drilling 
agreement was for an illegal purpose or violates Idaho law. 
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G. Duspiva Did Not "Hide the Details" Regarding the Status of the Well 
In Respondents' Brief, the Fillmores repeatedly assert that Mr. Duspiva "never" told the 
Fillmores that the well had encountered LTG conditions, and that he "never" told them about the 
costs and requirements associated with a LTG well. RB at 4,5, 7, 9, 12. These assertions are simply 
untrue and are contradicted by the testimony and evidence presented at trial, and by statements in 
Respondents' Brief itself. 
The Fillmores acknowledge that Mr. Duspiva told them on August 8, 2007 that the well had 
encountered LTG conditions and that they needed to contact IDWR because of the temperature 
situation." RB at 4,5. It is undisputed that on August 9th, after discussing the well with IDWR staff, 
Mr. Duspiva informed the Fillmores of the need to obtain a LTG permit to continue drilling. John 
Fi I Imore completed and signed a long form LTG permit application on August 16, 2007. Plaintiffs 
Ex. 6. On that form, the anticipated bottom hole temperature is marked as '"85 F to 212 F." 
Fillmores' counsel elicited the following testimony from Mr. Duspiva: 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Did you inform the Fillmores about the low temperature 
geothermal problem? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And you told them all the details of it and what they were going to be 
obligated to do? 
A. All that I knew. 
Tr. Vol. 2. p. 88, Ins. 1-8. 
The Fillmores' arguments and the district court's Findings of Fact leave the erroneous 
impression that Mr. Duspiva became aware that the well encountered LTG bottom hole water 
temperatures when the well had reached a depth of 600 feet, and that he delayed telling the Fillmores 
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about that fact until the well reached a depth of 836 feet on August 8, 2007. It is undisputed that Mr. 
Duspiva discovered that the strata in which the well was drilled had reached LTG temperatures on 
August 8, 2007. Up to that point, the temperature ofthe water he measured from the well was closer 
to 70° F. It was his understanding that those water temperature measurements reflected BHT. 
In this regard the Fillmores assert that Mr. Duspiva did not discover BHT at the 600 foot 
depth because he was not adequately monitoring BHT. RB at 4. This assertion misconstrues the 
evidence. The 600 foot depth was not a level at which Mr. Duspiva stopped while drilling to attempt 
"vater development. Consequently, there was no BHT to measure at that point. He did stop at 670 
feet to attempt development and measured water temperature to be 72 ° F. He understood this water 
measurement to reflect BHT. When he reached 836 feet on August 8th and felt warm clay cuttings, 
he stopped drilling and measured the strata of the well at 100 foot increments from 300 feet to 800 
feet including 600 feet. See AB at 6. When he measured the temperatures of the strata in which the 
well was drilled at those 100 foot increments, they were not taken at the bottom of the well and they 
did not measure water temperature. Plaintiffs Ex. 4. 
No witness testified that Mr. Duspiva was not adequately monitoring BHT in the Fillmore 
well. While IDWR's Well Construction Standards define BHT as the "temperature of the ground 
water encountered in the bottom of a well" (lDAPA37.03.09.010.09), there is no IDWR guidance 
stating ho"v that temperature is to be measured. IDWR's Rob Whitney testifIed that IDWR has no 
rule prescribing a methodology for measuring BHT. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 123, Ins. 14-22. The only IDWR 
rule that requires measuring BHT simply requires well drillers to maintain logs in which BHT is 
recorded, with no further instruction regarding the manner, methodology or frequency of the 
recording. IDAPA 37.03.10.050.i. 
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Mr. Dusiva was not the only source of information available to the Fillmores regarding the 
presence of LTG water in the well and the additional requirements IDWR imposes to complete such 
a \vell. IDWR Senior Water Resource Agent John Whitney also contacted the Fillmores to inform 
them that LTG conditions had been encountered and to see if they understood the implications of 
the LTG encounter. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 128, In. 13 - p. 129, In. 5. 
II. Mr. Duspiva Did Not Violate the ICPA 
Like the district court, the Fillmores assert that Mr. Duspiva violated the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (I CP A) by omission rather than by lying or misrepresenting facts. The district court's 
decision rests on Mr. Duspiva's assumed failure to more fully discuss with the Fillmores the use of 
screens and filter packs by other drillers as a means of developing water in strata that contains high 
quantities of sand. The district court also concluded that, because Mr. Duspiva doesn't use screens 
and filter packs to prevent sand from entering wells, his recommendations to the Fillmores to 
continue drilling as the well encountered water with excessive sand violated the ICPA's prohibition 
against recommending unnecessary services. 
The Fillmores also allege that Mr. Duspiva violated the ICPA by failing to discuss the 
potential for reaching LTG conditions, and "hiding" the details of the temperature status of the well 
as \',-ell as the implications of the well encountering LTG conditions. They infer from the mere fact 
that M1'. Duspiva charges by the foot, that Mr. Duspiva's recommendations to continue drilling and 
these alleged omissions were motivated by greed, despite Mr. Duspiva's undisputed testimony that 
shallower wells are more profitable than deeper wells because of the increased time and equipment 
required for deeper wells. T1'. Vol. 2, p. 114, In. 11 - p. 115, In. 11. And as previously discussed, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 13 
to make him sound even worse, they attempt to show that he drilled the Fillmores' well "illegally," 
and that TDWR staff disapproved of his drilling practices. 
Finding a violation of the TCPA is not as simple an undertaking as the district court's two 
paragraph analysis of the issue suggests. AR Vol. II, pp. 298-299. This is especially true for a 
service such as well drilling, which involves inherent uncertainties as to the conditions that will be 
encountered underground. 
A. Iep A Standard 
Neither the district nor the Fillmores show that Mr. Duspiva's alleged omissions meet the 
[CPA deception standard. For an act or practice to be "unfair or deceptive" under the TCPA, it must 
be shown that the person committing the act or practice "knows, or in the exercise of due care 
should know" that he is committing one of the acts enumerated in I.C. § 48-603. As explained in 
Appellants Brief: the rcp A provides that "due consideration and great weight shall be given to the 
interpretation of the federal trade commission and the federal courts relating to section 5 (a)( 1) ofthe 
federal trade commission act (15 US.C 45(a)(I), as from time to time amended .... " I.C. § 48-
604. Under federal law, the FTC "will find deception if there is a representation, omission or 
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the 
consumer's detriment." Southwest Sunsites v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals described the following three elements that must be shown: 
First, the FTC must show probable, not possible, deception (' likely to mislead,' not 
'tendency and capacity to mislead'). Second, the FTC must show potential deception 
of'consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances,' not just any consumers. Third. 
the new standard considers as material only deceptions that are likely to cause injury 
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to a reasonable relying consumer, whereas the old standard reached deceptions that 
a consumer might have considered important, whether or not there was reliance. 
ld.. at 1436. 
Generally, to find a violation under the federal act, there must be a misrepresentation of 
material tact. The expression of an honest opinion is not a basis to find a violation of the tederal act. 
unless there is no reasonable basis for the opinion. Sci. Mfg. Co. v. Fed. Trade Com, 124 F.2d 640, 
644-645 (3fd Cir. 1941). 
There has been no showing, finding or conclusion of law that Mr. Duspiva knew or in the 
exercise of due care should have known that he was committing any of the acts enumerated in I.e. 
~ 48-603. Neither the district nor the Fillmores have even considered the three elements of the 
deception standard identified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
B. Screens 
There has been no showing that Mr. Duspiva's practice of not using screens while drilling 
~including the 342 wells he has previously drilled) represents anything other than his honest opinion 
and best professional judgment. On cross-examination, counsel for the Fillmores referred Mr. 
Duspiva to his deposition testimony in which he described screens as a "hindrance." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
84. Ins. 8-11. Mr. Duspiva rejected counsel's assertion that, by hindrance, Mr. Duspiva meant 
hindering him from drilling deeper and making more money. ld., p. 87, Ins. 1-4. In that same 
deposition testimony, filed by the Fillmores' counsel with the district court on summary judgment, 
Mr. Duspiva explained his understanding of the potential for minerals and iron in water to cause 
screens to "eventually encrust over," thereby hindering the flow of water into the well. AR Vol. I, 
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p. 156, deposition page 62, In. 23 - p. 63, In. 8. There is no basis for the Fillmores' inference that 
Mr. Duspiva did not use screens simply to make more money. 
Application of standards for assessing whether conduct is deceptive under the TCPA is 
particularly important in situations such as this one, where the alleged violation of the act is not a 
lie, a factual misrepresentation, or a complete omission, but is instead a failure to fully explain a 
technical process to a self-described layman. Mr. Duspiva and Clyde both testified that, during their 
June 11. 2007 meeting, Clyde expressed his concern about sand because the amount of sand in his 
\vell damages his pumps, and Mr. Duspiva explained to Clyde that he did not use screens to prevent 
sand from entering wells. It is highly unlikely that there was no additional discussion of the purpose 
or use of screens during that meeting, but, because of Clyde's faulty memory and the fact that Mr. 
Duspiva was not asked to elaborate on the conversation during trial, the record does not establish. 
one \vay or the other, whether additional discussion occurred. 
The district court simply concluded that Mr. Duspiva's alleged failure to more fully discuss 
·with Clyde the well drilling industry practice of using screens and filter pacs violated I.e. § 48-603. 
subsections (16), (17) & (18), without any evidence that Mr. Duspiva knew the omission was 
misleading, false or deceptive, and no evidence or analysis to show that he should have known as 
much. The court made no finding and provided no analysis to explain how a well drilling customer 
sllch as Clyde, acting reasonably under the circumstances, or may have been mislead to his 
detriment. At a minimum, the June 11,2007 meeting put Clyde on notice that screens exist, are used 
by other drillers to prevent sand from entering a well, and are not used by Mr. Duspiva. 
Mr. Duspiva's representation to Clyde that he did not use screens was absolutely true. He 
advised Clyde up front that, where the well encountered sand in water, he would not be using screens 
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to develop that water. What more was Mr. Duspiva required to tell Clyde so as not be deceptive or 
misleading under the statute? Should a reasonable prospective well owner have inquired fUliher of 
Mr. Duspiva regarding this information, especially given his concern about sand? Should he have 
inquired of others or sought a second opinion or bid? Clyde had hired a well driller to drill a well 
for himself and could reasonably be expected to know how to make such inquiries or obtain a second 
opmlOn. 
C. Water Temperature 
Neither the Fillmores nor the district court have identified which subdivision(s) ofI.C. § 48-
603 are implicated by Mr. Duspiva's alleged omissions regarding well temperature. There has been 
no showing or finding that Mr. Duspiva knew or should have known that his alleged omissions 
regarding well temperature deceived the Fillmores. 
Regarding LTG wells, The district court observed that: 
At the time that the agreement was reached, Mr. Duspiva knew, and the Fillmores did 
not know, that: 
(l) there was a likelihood of reaching [LTG] conditions in this geographic area: 
(2) that a [LTG] well is inferior to a cold water domestic well for domestic purposes: 
(3) that a [LTG] well necessarily required increased cost and obligations fo the well owner 
and well driller. 
AR. Vol. II. p. 298. 
The district cOUli does not explain how any of these observations relates to an alleged 
violation of the ICPA. The record does show that Mr. Duspiva had prior experience with wells 
encountering LTG conditions. It is not clear that the record established that Mr. Duspiva knew that 
reaching LTG conditions in the Fillmores' well was likely. The third observation is related, since 
its relevance to Mr. Duspiva and to the Fillmores depends upon the likelihood that there would be 
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LTG conditions in the Fillmores' well. There is no showing or finding that Mr. Duspiva knew or 
should have known that failing to apprise Clyde of such a possibility would mislead or deceive the 
Fillmores to their detriment. 
There is no basis in the record for the district court's second observation that Mr. Duspiva 
knew or believed that "a low temperature geothermal well is inferior to a cold water domestic well 
for domestic purposes." Fillmores correctly cite Mr. Squires' testimony as the source of this 
finding. wherein Mr. Squires said "to me, low temperature geothermal water is not desirable for 
potable water supplies." RB at 5, citing Tr. Vol. 3, p. 95, Ins. 11-12. In fact, neither Mr. Duspiva 
nor any other witness testified that Mr. Duspiva knew or believed that a LTG well is inferior to a 
cold water well for domestic purposes. 
Was it reasonable for the Fillmores to believe or assume that there was no possibility that the 
'vvel! would encounter warm water simply because the issue of temperature was not discussed during 
the June 11,2007 meeting, particularly when it was expressly understood that Mr. Duspiva provide 
no guarantee regarding temperature? Is the burden entirely upon Mr. Duspiva to inform customers 
such as the Fillmores of all ofIDWR's requirements for LTG wells, or does the property owner have 
any independent obligation to know such requirements? None of these questions was addressed by 
the district court. 
Similarly, the district court did not explain in what way Mr. Duspiva knew or should have 
known that he was misleading Clyde or recommending services that were not needed when he 
reported encountering excessive sand at various water bearing layers. Clyde had explained his 
concern about sand. Mr. Duspiva had explained his standard for sand in the water. They agreed. 
When the well encountered excessive sand, Mr. Duspiva fully apprised Clyde of the situation, 
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recommended continued drilling as the only way Mr. Duspive could achieve water that met the 
criteria. and each time, Clyde instructed Mr. Duspiva to continue. 
As previously discussed, the Fillmores' assertions that Mr. Duspiva "hid the details" 
regarding the temperature status of the well and the implications of owning a LTG well are not true. 
Mr. Duspiva advised them as soon as he learned that the well had encountered LTG conditions, and 
explained the options for either continued drilling or attempting to seal and develop the well at a 
higher level. Well temperature had not been a term or condition of the agreement. Temperature was 
not discussed on June 11, 2007. Consistent with this Court's recognition of the uncertainties 
involved in drilling wells and its interpretation of well drilling agreements, it was expressly 
understood that Mr. Duspiva provided no guarantees regarding the quantity or quality of water the 
\vell would produce. 
III. The District Court Incorrectly Applied I.e. § 48-608(1) 
The Fillmores appear to agree with the legal principle that the existence of a contractual 
relationship is a prerequisite to finding a violation of the ICPA and choosing or awarding one of the 
remedies provided by I.e. § 48-608(1). Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 788. 640 P.2d 1186, 1189 
(1982). This necessarily means that the district court erred in determining that finding a violation 
of the ICPA obviates the need to determine whether an contract was formed. AR, Vol. II. p. 297. 
The plain language of the statute provides that an injured party may treat the agreement 
between the parties "as voidable or, in the alternative, may bring an action to recover actual 
damages." This Court confirmed this plain reading ofthe statute less than a year ago in Knipe Land 
Co. v. Robertson. in which this Court held that complainants who elected to treat an employment 
contract as void "chose their remedy under I.C. § 48-608(1) and cannot also sue to recover actual 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF - Page 19 
damages." 259 P.3d 595 at 606 (2011). Contrary to statute, the district court awarded and the 
Fillmores claim both remedies. 
IV. Ed Squires' Expert Testimony Should Have Been Excluded 
The Fillmores argue that Mr. Duspiva "waived any objection" to the testimony ofFillmores' 
expert Mr. Ed Squires because "Mr. Duspiva did not object to any ofMr. Squires' testimony at trial." 
This is not true. Fillmores fail to mention the following objection made by Mr. Duspiva's counsel 
as soon as Fillmores' called Mr. Squires during the third and final day of trial: 
MR. SMITH: Understood. Thank you. Defendants call as witness Mr. Edward 
Squires. 
MR. GOULD: And, Your Honor, I'm going to object to the testimony to preserve the 
record. Mr. Squires was not mentioned as an expert witness in a timely manner. He 
was only mentioned as an expert -- his opinion or potential opinion testimony was 
only provided to counsel two days prior to trial which is contrary to the rules and 
contrary to case law. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gould, we went through this. 
MR. GOULD: I'm just preserving the record. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE CO UR T: Just so you understand, the record does include your 0 bj ection and the 
two-hour hearing that we did on this last Thursday, and clearly you've got your 
objection on the record. 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 36. Ins. 4-19. 
As the district court observed, the basis ofMr. Duspiva's objection is clear in the record. The 
district court issued an order requiring the Fillmores to "disclose expert witnesses and comply vvith 
[IRCP] 26(b)(4)(a) no later than March 15,2010." Tr. Vol. 3, p. 7, Ins. 3-6. Pursuant to IRCP 
26(b)( 4 )(a), Mr. Duspiva served the Fillmores with an interrogatory requesting the identity. subject 
matter. facts and opinions of each expert the Fillmores expected to testify at trial. [d., Ins. 11-21. 
In their initial response to this interrogatory, the Fillmores identified Mr. Squires, did not describe 
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any of his expected testimony, and reserved the right to supplement their response. ld., p. 7, In. 22 -
p. 8, In. 8. 
On July 27, 2010, Mr. Duspiva filed a motion in limine to exclude the Fillmores' proposed 
experts because the Fillmores did not deliver supplemental responses to Mr. Duspiva's discovery 
responses identifying the subject matter, facts and opinions, to which Fillmores' experts would 
testify. On August 18, 2010, the day before hearing on Mr. Duspiva's motion in limine and just 
three business days before the start of trial, the Fillmores delivered supplemental responses stating 
Mr. Squires' opinions and expected testimony. 
During the August 19,2010 hearing on Mr. Duspiva's motion in limine, counsel for Mr. 
Duspi va explained the Fillmores' failure to seasonably supplement their responses to Mr. Duspiva' s 
interrogatory no. 3, and the legal basis for excluding Mr. Squires' testimony pursuant to IRCP 26( e). 
ld.. pp. 7-13. 
MR GOULD: . . . So that kind oftakes us where we are. You know, basically 
three days before trial I received opinions that the defendants would like to use, and 
I'm not able to depose those experts at this time. I'm not able to obtain experts to 
counter the opinions that I just received. 
I made a timely request. And at no time after March did the defendant state that these 
people would be testifying as experts. And to the contrary, on June 9th defendants 
identified these people as fact or lay witnesses. 
So it would be incredibly inefficient and costly for my client to attempt to depose 
someone with a wealth of knowledge over many subjects to try to identify what they 
mayor may not be testifying to. 
And as I stated, it's not my client's burden, and it's completely impractical and nearly 
impossible to depose an expert when you have no idea what they're testifYing to. 
hl.. p. 13, Ins. 3-21. 
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After counsel for the Fillmores explained the opinions he expected Mr. Squires to offer, the 
district court acknowledged that Fillmores did not meet their duty under IRCP 26( e) to seasonably 
supplement their discovery responses regarding Mr. Squires: 
THE COURT: Mr. Gould, it would seem to me that that's precisely what you're 
objecting to. Is that right? 
MR. GOULD: It is completely speCUlative, and it's all opinion, And it's information 
I didn't receive until this morning .... 
THE COURT: Hang on, Mr. Gould. The court is of the opinion that this does violate 
the requirement for a disclosure. And had it been disclosed to you much earlier. I can 
certainly see, Mr. Gould, you deciding to either depose Mr. Squires to inquire further 
as to what this opinion is or request permission to contact him to discuss this matter 
yourself. 
}d., p. 28. In. 21 - p. 29, In. 14. 
THE COURT: But, Mr. Gould, I do share or understand your objection. and I think 
I tend to agree with you that to the extent you're prejudiced by not being aware of 
some of these opinions until today, I think that the court most likely will have to 
exclude that testimony because as you've cited in the - I think it's the Radmer case 
- it could be reversible error. 
}d., p. 3 Lin. 21 0 p. 32, In. 5. 
Notwithstanding the prejudicial effect ofthe Fillmores' failure comply with IRCP 26( e). the 
district court allowed Mr. Squires to testifY in order to "educate the court." recognizing only that Mr. 
Duspiva's objections to Mr. Squires' opinions regarding the Fillmores' allegations that Mr. Duspiva 
was negligent in drilling the Fillmores' well "may be well taken." Id., p. 37, Ins. 13-17. In order to 
have it both ways (acknowledging Fillmores' violation ofIRCP 26(e) and yet allowing Mr. Squires 
to testify), the district court announced the following approach: 
THE COURT: ... So, again, I guess Mr. Gould, "I'm going to rely on you to set forth 
specific objections in the trial if you believe there is some opinion testimony coming 
in that relates to issues that were not disclosed to you. 
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MR. SMITH: This is Bruce Smith. Understood. 
ld.. p. 37, In. 22 - p. 38, In. 2. 
In their Response Brief, Fillmores state that Mr. Duspiva's counsel agreed with the court's 
approach by quoting, out of context, a statement he made much later during the hearing (23 pages 
later in the transcript). RB at 13, 15. It is clear from the above quote that it was Fillmores' counsel, 
not Mr. Duspiva's counsel, that agreed with the court's approach. The quoted statement of Mr. 
Duspiva's counsel OCCUlTed at the end of the August 19th hearing: 
THE COURT: Any other preliminary matters anybody wants to discuss? 
MR. GOULD: I guess I am getting more concerned with Ed Squires' testimony. But 
I'll just make my objection, and the case will move on. 
ld., p. 60, Ins. 16-21. 
The court then concluded the hearing with these statements: 
THE COURT: I intend to exclude testimony that would be regarding opinions that 
he may hold relating to negligence on the part of your client that maybe you didn't 
have any awareness of until yesterday or this moming. I think that is probably an 
objection that is well taken. 
But by the same token, for his ability to describe well drilling process and educate the 
cOUli, I'm kind of interested in hearing that testimony just to give the court assistance 
in understanding the evidence that will be presented. 
lei .. p. 60. In. 24 - p. 61, In. 9. 
As explained above, consistent with his statement to court on August 19th, Mr. Duspiva's 
counsel objected to Mr. Squires' testimony during trial as soon as Mr. Squires was called as a 
witness, and the case moved on. This objection obviated the need to make multiple specific 
objections as suggested by the district court during the hearing on Mr. Duspiva's motion in limine, 
and ensured that Mr. Duspiva's objection based in IRCP 26(e) was preserved in the record. 
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Fillmores argue that permitting Mr. Squires to testifY was appropriate because his testimony 
was consistent with the court's ruling on Mr. Duspiva's motion to exclude. RB at 14. This 
argument misses the fundamental reason Mr. Squires' testimony should have been excluded. 
Fillmores did not supplement their discovery response to Mr. Duspiva's interrogatory no. 3 to 
identity the subject matter, facts or opinions about which Mr. Squires would testifY until three days 
before trial. Because of this extremely late disclosure, which did not comply with IRCP 26(e), Mr. 
Duspiva was unable to properly understand or evaluate this expert's testimony, depose Mr. Squires, 
or prepare and present a rebuttal witness. This is why Mr. Squires' testimony should have been 
excluded. not merely to prevent Mr. Squires from offering opinions to support the Fillmores' 
negligence allegations. 
The Fillmores point out that Mr. Squires did not mention Mr. Duspiva's name. Mr. Squires 
did not describe Mr. Duspiva's drilling methods as improper or unreasonable, or testify that Mr. 
Duspiva did anything wrong in drilling the Fillmores' well. Nonetheless, Mr. Squires, \vho is not 
a \vell driller and has never drilled a well, gave lengthly testimony regarding the use of screens in 
well drilling, opining on what happens when a screen is not used in a welL that they are commonly 
and easily used by well drillers, and that they are a reasonable drilling practice in the area of the 
Fillmores' well. Id., p. 69-98. 
The prejudicial impact ofMr. Squires' testimony on the district court's decision is evident 
from the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. AR, Vol. II, pp. 8-10, ~~47-52. The 
Fillmores and the district court rely upon Mr. Squires testimony for more than merely "educational" 
purposes. to reach inappropriate conclusions about Mr. Duspiva's conduct in drilling the Fillmores' 
well. 
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For example, Fillmores refer to the district court's finding that, at the time the well drilling 
agreement was entered, "Mr. Duspiva knew, and the Fillmores did not know, that ... a low 
temperature geothennal well is inferior to a cold water domestic well for domestic purposes." AR, 
Vol. II, p. 298. Fillmores cite Mr. Squires' testimony as the source of this finding, wherein Mr. 
Squires said "to me. low temperature geothennal water is not desirable for potable water supplies." 
RB at 5. citing Tr. Vol. 3, p. 95, Ins. 11-12. In fact, neither Mr. Duspiva nor any other witness 
testified that Mr. Duspiva knew or believed that a LTG well is inferior to a cold water well for 
domestic purposes. This erroneous finding highlights the district court's inappropriate reliance upon 
Mr. Squires' opinion testimony, used, in this particular instance, to establish Mr. Duspiva's 
knO\;vledge or state of mind at the time he and the Fillmores entered the well drilling agreement. It 
is difficult to imagine a more prejudicial use of Mr. Squires' testimony, particularly one that was 
ostensibly testifying generally about well drilling methods. 
Without citing the record, the Fillmores state that Mr. Squires' testimony is "consistent with 
much ofMr. Whitney's testimony and his report, as well as the testimony of Tom Neace, another 
I D WR employee." RB at 15. In fact, most of the testimony of those witnesses relates to their 
interactions with Mr. Duspiva on the Fillmore well and on prior wells, \vhich the Fillmores 
introduced in an effort to substantiate their enoneous allegations that Mr. Duspiva drilled the 
Fillmore well "illegally" (discussed supra at 8-10). Mr. Squires provided no testimony as to whether 
Mr. Duspiva met IDWR well drilling standards. 
The district com1 did not rely upon the testimony of any other witness to support its findings 
regarding drilling methods. Based on Mr. Squires' testimony alone, the district court concluded that 
using a screen and filter pack in well drilling in the area sunounding the Fillmore well is "a 
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reasonable drilling practice," that there was "no reason that the Fillmore well drilled by Mr. Duspiva 
needed to reach low temperature geothermal conditions," and that "[t]he uncontroverted evidence 
in this case is that screening could have been done at relatively low cost at depths much less than Mr. 
Duspiva was recommending." AR, Vol. II, p. 298. The district court inferred from Mr. Squires' 
testimony a duty of care by which to evaluate Mr. Duspiva's well drilling conduct. These are the 
opinions the Fillmores' counsel telegraphed to the court during the hearing on Mr. Duspiva's motion 
in limine that Mr. Squires would provide. In fact, no witness testified that there was no reason for 
the Fillmores to reach LTG conditions, or that the Fillmore well could have been screened at lower 
cost at much lower depths. Allowing Mr. Squires to provide such testimony and drawing these 
conclusions from it contradicted the district court's prior determinations that Mr. Squires would not 
be allowed to provide opinions related to negligence. 
IRCP 26(e) imposes on parties "a duty seasonably to amend a prIor response" to 
interrogatories. and provides that failure to meet this duty is grounds to "exclude the testimony of 
witnesses or the admission of evidence not disclosed by the required supplementation of the response 
of the party." The Fillmores have failed to explain their failure to comply with IRCP 26(e) or to 
address the previously-cited cases in which this Court has found that district courts abused their 
discretion by allowing expert testimony under circumstances very similar to this case. Clark v. 
Klein. 137 Idaho 154.45 P.3d 810 (2002); Radmer v. Ford AJotor Co., 120 Idaho 86. 813 P.2d 897 
(1991). The rationale for the rule, as explained in Radmer and in Clark, is directly applicable to this 
case: 
In generaL Rule 26 of the Idaho rules, like its federal analogue, was designed to 
promote candor and fairness in the pre-trial discovery process. Speaking with 
reference to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) 2 of the federal rules, the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules which promulgated the original draft of Rule 26 stated: 
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In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a prohibition against 
discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in acute form the 
very evils that discovery has been created to prevent. Effective cross-
examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation. .. Similarly, 
effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the 
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the narrowing 
of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery normally produces are 
frustrated. 
Advisory Committee Notes, rule 26, Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. Further 
illustrating the critical nature of complete and accurate responses regarding expert 
witnesses in the discovery process, one scholar notes: 
It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination, 
and this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to 
pretrial discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved . 
. . - Before an attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination 
with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the 
bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is 
required to await examination at trial to get this information, he often 
will have too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in 
the testimony. 
137 Idaho at 157,45 P.3d at 813; 120 Idaho at 89,813 P.2d 900. 
As in Clark and Radmer, the Fillmores' failure to timely supplement their discovery 
responses to identify the subject matter of Mr. Squire's testimony violates the spirit and letter of 
IRCP 26( e). Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Squires testimony 
over Mr. Duspiva's objection. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that Mr. Duspiva and the Fillmores entered an agreement on June 1 L 2007 
for Mr. Duspiva to provide the Fillmores well drilling services. That agreement was repeatedly 
ratified by Clyde Fillmore each time he instructed Mr. Duspiva to continue drilling, when he 
received Mr. Duspiva's invoice without objection, and each time he paid Mr. Duspiva. Mr. Duspiva 
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performed well drilling services as agreed in a workmanlike manner, and the Fillmores did not 
complain about Mr. Duspiva's work until after it was complete. The district court ened in failing 
to find that the agreement existed, and that Mr. Duspiva' s work and charges were in accordance with 
the agreement. 
Fillmores breached the agreement by not making full payment for Mr. Duspiva's work. To 
avoid payment. Fillmores wrongfully assert that Mr. Duspiva violated the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (ICP A). The Fillmores did not meet their burden to show that Mr. Duspiva deceived 
them. The district court ened in concluding that Mr. Duspiva violated the ICPA by inadequately 
educating Clyde Fillmore on the screening practices of other well drillers. The district court ened 
further by determining that it was not required to determine the existence, terms and conditions of 
the agreement in order to apply the ICP A, and by awarding the Fillmores both of the alternative 
remedies of voiding the agreement and seeking damages provided by I.C. § 48-608( 1). 
Finally. the district court ened by allowing Fillmores expert witness, Ed Squires. to testify. 
Squires should have been excluded under IRCP 26(e) due the extremely late and prejudicial 
disclosure on the eve of trial of the facts and opinions to which he would testify. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2012. 
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